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Google v Equustek1 has garnered worldwide attention as a case at the forefront
of a trend, on the part of national courts and regulators, to assert broad jurisdiction
in issuing content takedown orders against search engines and other online
intermediaries.2 Although international law has long recognized that free speech
may be justifiably limited to prevent crime or defamation,3 how best to apply
this principle to search engines and other intermediaries has been the subject
of increasing litigation and debate.4 One area of concern involves a recognition,
primarily in Europe, of a “right to be forgotten,” which has been held to justify
1.
2.

3.

4.

Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 34 [Equustek].
See the survey of cases set out in Alicia Solow-Niederman et al, “Here, There, or Everywhere?
Assessing the Geographic Scope of Content Takedown Orders” (2017) Harvard Law
School & Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society Working Paper, online: <clinic.
cyber.harvard.edu/files/2017/03/Here-There-or-Everywhere-2017-03-27.pdf> [perma.
cc/3WC9-NNGZ]. For notable decisions, see Google Spain SL v Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos (AEPD), C-131/12, [2014] ECR I-00000 [Google Spain]; Commission
Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, 21 May 2015, Décision n°2015-047 du 21
mai 2015 [2015] [CNIL]; Trib gr inst Paris, 6 November 2013, Max Mosley c Google Inc et
Google France [2013] RG 11/07970 [Mosley France]. In Google Spain, the Court of Justice
of the European Union interpreted a European Council directive on personal data to order
Google to remove links to content relating to the claimant’s past financial activities—though
the decision is unclear as to the territorial scope of the order. In CNIL, the French Data
Protection Authority ordered Google to globally delist links to sites in cases involving
European data protection law; initially appealed to France’s Conseil d’État but now referred
to the European Court of Justice and pending. In Mosley France, the Tribunal de Grand
Instance de Paris ordered a global delisting of content on Google Images. See also EC,
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),
[2016] OJ, L 119/1. Powers of European courts and regulators to issue extra-territorial
content takedown orders against online intermediaries will expand as the 2016 General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) takes effect in 2018. For an overview of the GDPR in this
context, see Daphne Keller, “The Right Tools: Europe’s Intermediary Liability Laws and the
2016 General Data Protection Regulation” (2018) 33 BTLJ 297.
See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November
1950, 213 UNTS 221 art 10 (entered into force 3 September 1953). Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) asserts the right to freedom of expression
“subject to such formalities and conditions … as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a
democratic society … [including] the prevention of disorder or crime ... [or] the protection
of the reputation or rights of others.” See also International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 art 19 (entered into force 23 March 1976,
accession by Canada 19 May 1976). Article 19 contains similar language to Article 10 of the
ECHR. See also Agnes Callamard, “The Control of ‘Invasive’ Ideas in a Digital Age” (2017)
84 Soc Research 119 (examining recent trends in the regulation of speech online in light of a
broader history of the right to free expression in international law).
Callamard, supra note 3. See also the survey of cases set out in Solow-Niederman et
al, supra note 2.
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orders compelling intermediaries to remove content to prevent reputational
harm.5 Another area of concern is intellectual property law, in which courts
and legislatures throughout the world have grappled with the responsibilities of
search engines and other intermediaries in preventing piracy.6 In both contexts,
a view has emerged to the effect that where a portal’s links direct a critical mass of
users to a site, they facilitate the harm at issue and no longer engage in protected
speech (what can be called the “critical mass theory of links”).7 Taking this
5.

6.

7.

See e.g. NT1 & NT2 v Google LLC, [2018] EWHC 799 (QB) at para 223 (ordering Google
to delist links to information about an applicant’s past criminal conviction that was held to
be “out of date, irrelevant and of no sufficient legitimate interest to users of Google Search
to justify its continued availability”). See also Google Spain, supra note 2; Mosley France, supra
note 2. For a recent overview of law and scholarship on the right to be forgotten, see Jennifer
Daskal, “Borders and Bits” (2018) 71 Vand L Rev 179 at 210-18. On the application of
the concept in the Canadian context, see Andrea Slaine, “Search Engines and the Right to
be Forgotten: Squaring the Remedy with Canadian Values on Personal Information Flow”
(2018) 55 Osgoode Hall LJ 349.
Cartier International AG v British Sky Broadcasting Limited, [2016] EWCA Civ 658 [Cartier
CA] (Court of Appeal for England and Wales upholding an order against five internet service
providers to block access to websites selling counterfeit copies of the plaintiffs’ goods);
CA Paris, 15 March 2016, Association des Producteurs de Cinéma (APC) v Orange SA (2016)
Commercial Court No 2 of Barcelona, No 14/01359 [APC v Orange] (ISPs ordered to
block and search engines to delist movie streaming sites); Disney Entertainment Inc v Telenor
Norge AS, Case No 16-072899TVI-OTIR/08, Oslo District Court, 22 June 2016 [Disney v
Telenor] (ISP ordered to block a streaming site); Asociacion de Gestion de Derechos Intelectuales
v Jazz Telecom, Judgment No 219/16, 2nd Commercial Court of Barcelona, 25 July 2016.
See also Canada’s Copyright Modernization Act, SC 2012, c 20 [CMA] (adding section
41.27 to the Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42, which allows for search engine de-listing
orders in copyright infringement cases [discussed further in Part II of this paper]); the Stop
Online Piracy Act, HR 3261 (a bill of the US House of Representatives in 2011 containing
provisions for search engine delisting orders in copyright infringement cases–but not passed);
and the Digital Economy Act 2010 (UK), c 4 (a UK bill containing sections 16 and 17
allowing for removal orders against search engines in copyright infringement cases, though
the provisions were later repealed).
See e.g. Disney v Telenor, supra at note 6. The court states that: “[a]s neutral intermediaries,
they have the best opportunity to stop infringements by blocking their customers’ access
to websites where infringements take place on a large scale”; APC v Orange, supra at note 6
(the court ordering search engines to delist streaming sites, declining to accept that search
engines play a neutral role). The critical mass theory of linking is also implied in a number
of US district court decisions in intellectual property infringement cases, in which courts
impose delisting orders against non-party search engines or ISPs as incidental features of an
injunction primarily aimed at the infringing defendant. See e.g. Hermès International v John
Doe et al, 12 Civ 1623 (SDNY 2012) [Hermès]; Chanel Inc v Does, 11-Cv-01508-KJD-PAL
(D Nev, November 14, 2011) [Chanel]; ABS-CBN Corporation v Ashby, 3:14-cv-01275-HU
(Dist Or 2014); Richemont International SA v Chen, 1:12-cv-06689 (SDNY 2013),
ABS-CBN Corporation v Cinesilip.net, 2017 WL 1628900 (SD Fla 2017) [ABS-CBN];
and American Chemical Society v John Does 1-99, 1:17-cv-726-LMB-JFA (ED Vir 2017)
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approach, courts and lawmakers have crafted rules for content removal against
intermediaries that have broad implications for freedom of expression online.
The Supreme Court of Canada’s 2017 decision in Google v Equustek
exemplifies this approach.8 As the first decision from an apex court in which a
search engine was directly enjoined—globally—from including links to a site
alleged to be hosting pirated content,9 it garnered considerable attention and
criticism worldwide,10 and has begun to serve as a precedent.11 However, it has
thus far not received much scholarly attention and, given its potential import

[American Chemical]. Among the reputational harm cases, the critical mass theory is also
discernible. See e.g. Google Spain, supra note 2 at paras 35, 80, 81 (on the “significant”
effect of search engines on personal privacy and data compared to individual sites, and the
need to protect privacy generally overriding the public interest in access to information).
Distinguished from the reasoning in these cases are those in which a search engine’s
auto-complete or snippet-view functions are held to repeat a defamation, making the search
index a secondary publisher. See e.g. Google Inc v Duffy [2017] SASC 130; Google Inc v
Trkulja [2016] VSCA 333.
8. Equustek, supra note 1.
9. See also Google Spain, supra note 2. This case is a key precedent, ordering Google to remove
links in a reputational harm case. As noted, the decision did not make the territorial scope of
the order clear and the matter is pending before the CJEU.
10. Hamza Shaban, “How a Supreme Court case in Canada could force Google to censor
speech worldwide” (29 June 2017), online: <www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/
wp/2017/06/29/how-a-supreme-court-case-in-canada-could-force-google-to-censor-speechworldwide/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.42737d9cf9ac>; [perma.cc/DN29-WRHU]; The
Guardian, “Google can be forced to pull results globally, Canada supreme court rules” (29
June 2017), online: <www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jun/28/canada-google-resultssupreme-court> [perma.cc/2B2R-EX4J]; Le Monde, “Google contraint par le Canada
à déréférencer des liens à l’échelle mondiale” (29 June 2017), <www.lemonde.fr/pixels/
article/2017/06/29/google-contraint-par-le-canada-a-dereferencer-des-liens-a-l-echellemondiale_5152989_4408996.html> [perma.cc/5XFY-G6HL]. Criticism of the decision is
discussed in Part I below.
11. Nazerali v Mitchell, 2018 BCCA 104 at paras 106-109. The British Columbia Court of
Appeal upheld a global takedown order in an online defamation case issued prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Equustek but citing the latter case as a precedent to justify
amending the order to allow for modifications in the event of a conflict of law. See also
Autorité des marchés financiers v PlexCorps, 2017 QCTMF 88. An order of the Financial
Markets Administrative Tribunal of Québec cited Equustek in an order against Facebook to
remove pages of companies in contravention of provincial securities law.
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for debates about content takedown orders and for internet jurisdiction more
broadly, it bears relevance to a range of stakeholders and merits closer analysis.12
Briefly, a lower court in this case imposed an injunction against Google,
a third-party to litigation involving intellectual property infringement, to remove
links directing traffic to the defendant’s site not only from google.ca, but
worldwide.13 The court imposed the order on the basis of finding that since Google
was generating most of the traffic to the site, it was “inadvertently facilitating” the
harm and de-listing from google.ca alone would not be effective.14 The Supreme
Court upheld the global takedown order. The majority agreed that search engine
links engage freedom of expression, but it declined to view links that direct a
critical mass of users to infringing sites as protected speech. A court in California
has since granted an injunction in Google’s favour, precluding enforcement of
the Canadian order in the United States on the basis that it conflicts with US
law.15 In 2018, Google returned to court in British Columbia seeking to vary
the global takedown order to exclude its application to Google in the United
States, but the BC court dismissed the application.16 The Canadian takedown

12. Aside from the online commentary published in response to the Supreme Court’s decision
(canvased below), scholarly treatment of the case has thus far been brief or indirect and
relates mostly to the lower court decisions. See e.g. Michael Rosenstock, “Is There a ‘Right
to Be Forgotten’ in Canada’s Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents
Act (PIPEDA)?” (2016) 14 CJLT 131; Krystyna Kowalik-Banczyk & Oreste Pollicino,
“Migration of European Judicial Ideas Concerning Jurisdiction over Google on Withdrawal
of Information” (2016) 17 German LJ 315; Leslie E Minora, “U.S. Courts Should Not Let
Europe’s ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Force the World to Forget” (2017) 89 Temp L Rev 609.
On the Supreme Court’s decision in Equustek see Slaine, supra note 5 at 371-72; Daskal,
supra note 5, nn 130-32; Andrew Keane Woods, “Litigating Data Sovereignty” (2018) 128
Yale LJ 328, at 343-45, 375-78.
13. The facts and decisions are canvassed in more detail below.
14. Equustek Solutions Inc v Jack, 2014 BCSC 1063, Fenlon J [Equustek Solutions Inc].
15. Google LLC v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 US Dist Lexis 206818 (ND Cal
2017). This decision, along with a preliminary injunction issued the month prior,
is discussed infra note 60.
16. Equustek Solutions Inc v Jack, 2018 BCSC 610. Upon review of the December San Jose
decision, Justice Smith declined to vary the global order partly on the basis that
[t]he U.S. decision does not establish that the injunction requires Google to violate American
law. … [T]here is no suggestion that any U.S. law prohibits Google from de-indexing those
websites, either in compliance with the injunction or for any other reason. … A party being
restricted in its ability to exercise certain rights is not the same thing as that party being
required to violate the law.

(Ibid at 20). He also found no material change in circumstances to justify varying the order.
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order continues to apply to Google worldwide, pending the outcome of the trial
between the primary parties.
More broadly, the Equustek decision continues to serve as a key case in an
emerging body of law on content takedown orders. Whether it proves to be an
important precedent internationally remains to be seen. But courts and lawmakers,
in Canada and beyond, will likely point to the decision as one viable solution to
the larger problems with which it engages. The solution, however, is questionable
in light of critical responses to the case (explored below) arguing that it failed to
accord due weight to the speech interests of large intermediaries and the users
who depend on them. Given the global interest the case has generated thus far,
and its potential relevance to a wide range of debates about online speech, Part
I of this commentary examines the decisions of the lower courts and arguments
of the parties in some detail, along with the Supreme Court decision and critical
responses to it. The intention here is to lend a better sense, for readers, both
foreign and domestic, of the many contending strains of legal doctrine (equitable
remedies, free speech, and defamation, among others) in which the parties sought
to frame the core issues and to clarify the procedural context in which the global
takedown order was fashioned and justified in the case. The general argument of
Part I is that, at all levels of court, judges embraced a theory of linking as a form
of facilitation premised on the fact that search links point a critical mass of users
to harmful content. Embracing this view, courts at all levels failed to recognize the
nature and importance of search links as a form of speech.17 Without seeing links
that merely point to harmful content as warranting protection, or attempting to
engage the issue in any depth, the courts largely overlooked the takedown order’s
broader implications for free speech online.

17. James Grimmelmann discusses the issue of search engine indexes as a form of speech, setting
out the conduit, editorial, and advisor models. See “Speech Engines” (2014) 98 Minn L Rev
868. Eric Goldman, Eugene Volokh, and Donald M Falk, and Heather Whitney further
discuss the models laid out in Grimmelmann. See Eric Goldman, “Search Engine Bias and
the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism” (2006) 8 Yale JL & Tech 188; Eugene Volokh &
Donald M Falk, “Google First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results”
(2012) 8 JL Econ & Pol’y 883; Heather Whitney, “Search Engines, Social Media, and the
Editorial Analogy” (February 2018), online: Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia
University <knightcolumbia.org/content/search-engines-social-media-and-editorial-analogy>
[perma.cc/4GJ3-XH3P]. Similarly, Oren Bracha, Stuart Minor Benjamin, and Tim Wu
explore whether algorithmic search results constitute speech. See Oren Bracha, “The Folklore
of Informationalism: The Case of Search Engine Speech” (2014) 82 Fordham L Rev 1629;
Stuart Minor Benjamin, “Algorithms and Speech” (2013) 161 U Pa L Rev 1445; Tim Wu,
“Machine Speech” (2013) 161 U Pa L Rev 1495.
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Much of the critical response to the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the
global takedown order was focused on the undervaluing of Google’s expression
interests. The criticism was largely silent, however, on an important tactical
shortcoming on the part of Google and its sympathetic intervenors in the course
of the litigation. A secondary aim of Part I is to show that while Google and
free speech intervenors raised valid concerns about the potential impact of a
global takedown order on speech, they failed to make clear why links to harmful
content constitute valuable speech. This was a core question at all levels of court,
and neither Google nor its allied intervenors succeeded in offering a clear and
persuasive answer.
Part II of this commentary argues that an important source for the answer
to this core question can be found in the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in
Crookes v Newton, which set out a distinctly different theory of links as a form
of speech. The Court in Crookes held that links to defamatory content are not a
form of publication, due in part to their character as “mere references” but due
also to the vital role links play in the function of the internet as a medium for the
open exchange of information. In short, the answer Crookes offers to the search
link problem in Equustek is that mere links to any content, harmful or not, are
a valuable form of online speech because of their basic character as links.18 They
serve a core function of the internet and any attempt to fashion categorical rules
for their interference will necessarily have a broad impact on the medium. The
Court should have applied its more considered view of links in Crookes to the
case of search engines in Equustek on the basis that search links are, in principle,
no different from other links and thus bear value. However, Equustek presented a
new conundrum: At scale, links that merely refer can facilitate harm. What was
needed, therefore, was a test that recognizes the value of links as such, but also
the need in some cases to hold large portals responsible—though not liable—for
facilitating harm.
Part II then sets out a test for imposing extra-territorial takedown orders
that attempts to strike a better balance between free speech and private interests.
It draws on recent amendments to Canada’s Copyright Act (CA) and to the Manila
Principles on Intermediary Liability,19 which both emphasize the principles of
necessity and proportionality, set a high bar for takedown orders, and seek to
18. Crookes v Newton, 2011 SCC 47 at para 51 [Crookes].
19. CMA, supra note 6 (adding section 41.27 and other provisions to the Copyright Act, RSC,
1985, c C-42); Electronic Frontier Foundation, “Manila Principles on Intermediary
Liability” (24 March 2015), online: <www.eff.org/files/2015/07/08/manila_principles_
background_paper.pdf#page=19> [perma.cc/UBJ6-M9SG] [Manila Principles].
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minimize their potential effects. The author applies this proposed test to the
facts in Equustek itself, drawing on the dissenting opinion at the Supreme Court
to support the view that the case would likely meet neither the necessity nor
proportionality prong of the test. The commentary concludes by suggesting that
a more equitable test would help address legitimate concerns that without greater
protection of the speech interests of large platforms, the internet’s function as a
global public sphere will be significantly compromised.

I. GOOGLE V EQUUSTEK
A. LOWER COURT DECISIONS

As noted above, Google was a third-party to the core claim in this case. A series
of interlocutory orders preceded the global takedown order that Google sought
to challenge. The procedural context is relevant to the larger conflict over how to
frame the core issues.
Equustek Solutions Inc. is a small technology company in British Columbia
that makes networking devices for industrial equipment.20 In April 2011,
Equustek sued its distributor, Datalink Technologies Gateways LLC (and its
principal, Morgan Jack), for re-labelling one of Equustek’s products and selling it
as Datalink’s own. Equustek also alleged that Datalink had used its trade secrets
to develop and sell a competing product. In September 2011, Justice Leask of
the Supreme Court of British Columbia issued an injunction against Datalink to
remove references to Equustek products on its website and to return confidential
source codes. In March 2012, Justice Fenlon found Datalink in breach of Justice
Leask’s order and issued a further order, but Datalink ignored this and fled the
jurisdiction. In July 2012, Justice Punnett found that Datalink had continued to
sell Equustek products online and issued a Mareva injunction21 for the seizure of
Datalink’s global assets. In August and September of that year, the court rendered
further decisions prohibiting Datalink from selling the entire class of equipment
at issue and finding Datalink’s principal, Morgan Jack, to be in contempt.
In September 2012, with Jack and Datalink’s whereabouts unknown and
Datalink continuing to sell online, Equustek asked Google to remove listings
of Datalink. Google would do so only with a court order and would de-list
only individual pages but not entire sites. In December 2012, Justice Tindale
issued an order prohibiting Datalink from “carrying on business through any
20. Equustek, supra note 1 at para 2.
21. Mareva Compania Naviera SA v International Bulkcarriers SA, [1975] 2 Lloyd’s Rep
509 (CA) [Mareva].
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website,”22 and soon after Google advised Equustek that it had de-indexed some
345 webpages relating to Datalink, but only for searches on google.ca. Datalink
continued to move infringing content to new pages on its sites.
In the fall of 2013, Equustek returned to court to seek an order that Google
remove links to Datalink websites on all of its search portals worldwide. Google
opposed the order on grounds familiar to those who have followed its earlier
litigation.23 Its index plays a “passive” role; it provides a “valuable tool” for
helping people navigate the web, and an order forcing it to “arbitrate disputes
over content” was impracticable at scale.24 An order to remove entire sites would
also constitute “undue censorship,” since some of the individual pages at a site
might serve innocent purposes.25 A global injunction would also place Google in
an “impossible situation” by asking it to do things that may be illegal in other
jurisdictions.26 Finally, Google maintained that any order should be limited to
google.ca, since courts in takedown cases against search engines have properly
restricted the scope of their orders to regional or country-specific indexes, given
the basis of the orders in national or regional law.27
Although Google offered several arguments against a global takedown
order, its core claim—on which it would rely throughout the litigation—was
that its search links play a neutral role in online speech. Google’s links, even to
harmful content, warrant protection because they merely refer to content rather
than offer judgment or facilitate harm. As earlier scholarship has noted, online
intermediaries had successfully relied on this framing in US cases as far back as
the mid-90s, when the internet first emerged.28 Courts had developed a body
of jurisprudence shielding intermediaries from liability for aiding in piracy or
22. Equustek, supra note 1 at para 14.
23. For the arguments advanced in earlier litigation, see Barry Sookman, “Is Google a Publisher
According to Google? The Google v Equustek and Duffy Cases” (10 October 2017),
online (blog): Copyright, Intellectual Property, Computer, Internet, e-Commerce Law <www.
barrysookman.com/2017/10/10/is-google-a-publisher-according-to-google-the-google-vequustek-and-duffy-cases> [perma.cc/YCG3-WNZX].
24. Equustek Solutions Inc, supra note 14 at paras 136-37.
25. Ibid at para 138.
26. Ibid at para 140. Notably, however, Google did not argue that a global takedown order
would violate US law (see ibid at para 144).
27. Ibid at paras 145, 149 (discussing the decision in Mosley France). See also Mosley
France, supra note 2.
28. See e.g. Jonathan Band & Matthew Schruers, “Safe Harbors Against the Liability Hurricane:
the Communications Decency Act and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act” (2002) 20
Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 295, citing Zeran v America Online, Inc, 129 F (3d) 327, 332 (4th
Cir 1997); Blumenthal v Drudge, 992 F Supp 44 (DDC 1998); Religious Technology Center v
Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc, 907 F Supp 1361 (ND Cal 1995).
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publishing defamatory content by applying generously the prohibition in section
230 of the Communications Decency Act29 (CDA) on treating intermediaries “as
the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.”30 In relying on the neutrality argument in this case, Google’s
counsel had therefore not simply sought to leverage the weight of US authority on
point but also to engage a deeply entrenched jurisprudential conception of online
portals as extensions of the internet’s core infrastructure. While this conception
may or may not have been plausible by the middle of the present decade, it might
have led Google to be confident enough in the neutrality theory to have made it
seem unnecessary to formulate a more nuanced response to the question: Why
are links to harmful content worth protecting?31
From June 2014 onward, Google would discover that its neutrality
argument would gain little traction in Canadian courts. That month, Justice
Fenlon dismissed Google’s arguments and issued an order requiring the company
to “cease indexing or referencing” on any of its sites of any of the defendant’s
pages or subpages, pending the resolution of the case or further direction by the
court.32 The court assumed jurisdiction over Google on the basis of its business
operations in British Columbia.33 It claimed the authority to impose the order
under its inherent jurisdiction to “maintain the rule of law and to control its
own process.”34 Yet, substantively, the order was based on two assumptions. The
first was that since seventy to seventy-five per cent of all internet searches were
conducted through Google, it was “inadvertently facilitating” the harm to the
plaintiff by directing the bulk of traffic to the defendant’s site.35 Justice Fenlon
also found that “[o]n the record before [him] it appears that to be effective, even
within Canada, Google must block search results on all of its websites.”36
29. Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 USCA § 230 (1996) [CDA].
30. Band & Schruers, supra note 28 at 297 (Band and Schruers’ article also contains a useful
summary of early cases relating to intermediary liability for online speech). For a more
recent overview, see Corey Omer, “Intermediary Liability for Harmful Speech: Lessons from
Abroad” (2014) 28 Harvard JL & Tech 289, at 301-305.
31. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer of this paper for noting this point.
32. Equustek, supra note 1 at para 17, citing Equustek Solutions Inc, supra note 14 at para 161.
33. Equustek Solutions Inc, supra note 14 at paras 22-65.
34. Ibid at para 121. The power, Fenlon J noted, is confirmed by section 39 of the Law and
Equity Act, RSBC 1996, c 253. Justice Fenlon also cited MacMillan Bloedel Ltd v Simpson
for the broader proposition that the court may issue an injunction “in all cases in which it
appears to the court to be just or convenient that the order should be made ... on terms and
conditions the court thinks just.” [1996] 2 SCR 1048 at para 15.
35. Equustek Solutions Inc, supra note 14 at para 152.
36. Ibid at para 148
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The second key assumption was that links to a source of piracy could not
constitute valuable speech and did not warrant protection. Justice Fenlon implied
this by asserting that the order would not censor Google or “block what is being
said,” but was “only a slight expansion on the removal of individual URLs, which
Google agreed to do voluntarily.”37 It would involve minimal inconvenience to
Google in light of removal requests it already carries out in relation to child
pornography and hate-speech.38 Justice Fenlon made no attempt to consider the
broader impact of a global takedown order on the expression interests of search
engines or users. On the contrary, there were no serious potential expression or
comity issues since, “most countries will likely recognize intellectual property
rights and view the selling of pirated products as a legal wrong.”39 The two
assumptions that framed Justice Fenlon’s justification for the global takedown
order would continue to frame the Court’s reasoning at the next two levels.
The Court of Appeal for British Columbia unanimously upheld the order.40
Justice Groberman (together with Justices Frankel and Harris) affirmed the
lower court’s in personam jurisdiction over Google for its commercial activity
in the province.41 Under the test set out in RJR-MacDonald,42 the balance of
convenience favoured issuing the order. Justice Groberman dismissed the comity
issue by asserting a similar faith in the wider moral basis for the order; as a measure
intended to prevent piracy, he asserted, “there is no realistic assertion that the
judge’s order will offend the sensibilities of any other nation.”43
What is notable about the Court of Appeal’s decision was that it glossed over
important distinctions in the case law on equitable remedies on which it drew
for support. Justice Groberman cited a host of cases for the broad proposition
that “courts of many other jurisdictions have found it necessary, in the context
of orders against Internet abuses, to pronounce orders that have international
effects.”44 Yet he made no effort to distinguish the scope of these orders, or the
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Ibid at para 137.
Ibid at para 139.
Ibid at para 144.
Equustek Solutions Inc v Google Inc, 2015 BCCA 265 [Equustek BCCA].
Ibid at paras 52-53.
RJR-MacDonald Inc v Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 SCR 311. See supra note 40
at paras 100-107. The defendant’s acts were held to cause the plaintiff irreparable harm;
an order with only a national scope would not be effective; and Google would not be
materially inconvenienced.
43. Equustek BCCA, supra note 40 at para 93. An important proviso limiting the scope of the
order, however, was that Google was free to return to court in British Columbia (see e.g.
ibid at para 94).
44. Ibid at para 95.

242

(2019) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

nature of the cases on which they were based. Many had involved reputational
harm rather than property (e.g., the Mosley cases, McKeogh, Google Spain),
and some involved regional orders or orders against parties hosting rather than
pointing to content (Yahoo! Inc and the German Mosley cases are examples
of both). Thus, none of the cases served as a clear precedent. Citing them as
supportive authorities prevented the court from recognizing both the novelty
and the magnitude of the lower court’s order in relation to earlier case law in the
broader field of intermediary liability.
At the Supreme Court of Canada, Google made a further attempt to
foreground the expression interests at stake in the order. It did so by offering two
general arguments in relation to search engine links as a form of speech. One had
more potential than the other. Neither proved persuasive to the majority, perhaps
in part because Google appeared to blur them together.45
The more promising argument was that while there may have been a
justification for limiting Datalink’s speech, there was no principled basis on
which to limit that of a search engine merely pointing to it.46 Doing so also
ran contrary to the Court’s holding in Crookes v Newton.47 In that case, links in
journalistic articles on one site to defamatory content on another were held to
engage free expression, and the defamatory nature of the content did not “defeat”
the defendant’s right to link to it.48 As Google noted, the Court’s rationale in
Crookes was premised on a recognition of the importance of hyperlinks to the
internet’s function as an information medium and a concern about a potentially
“devastating” chill on free expression if users merely linking were held liable
for defamation.49
The argument amounted to an attempt to reframe the central question
in the case. Google was implying that the Court should not ask what value,
as a form of speech, a single link might have to an infringing site. Rather, the
Court should have asked what value links per se have as part of the internet’s
infrastructure. However, while Google was on firm ground in appealing to the
Court’s earlier jurisprudence on linking, it might have been more explicit on the
45. Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 34 (Factum of the Appellant, Google Inc at
paras 40-45) [Google Factum] (the blurring to which I refer occurs in the discussion of the
Court of Appeal’s “three key errors in evaluating the interest of freedom of expression”).
46. Ibid at paras 27-29.
47. Crookes, supra note 18.
48. Google Factum, supra note 45 at para 32.
49. Ibid at para 31, 41. The Google Factum draws further support for this proposition from
Crookes, which states: “The Internet’s capacity to disseminate information has been described
by this Court as ‘one of the great innovations of the information age’ whose ‘use should
be facilitated rather than discouraged’ (SOCAN, at para 40, per Binnie J.). Hyperlinks,
in particular, are an indispensable part of its operation.” Supra note 18 at para 35.
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nature of the shift in perspective it was inviting the Court to undertake. Instead,
the argument on this point was relatively brief and undeveloped. It was also
advanced without being distinguished from a second, less promising argument:
Google as a neutral actor.
Despite Google’s lack of traction for this argument in the lower courts,
it argued once again that its search engine links were a valuable form of speech
because its primary aim as a speaker is to offer a neutral “catalogue” of the content
of cyberspace. The more accurate and complete the catalogue, the better it serves
users in pursuing a range of possible purposes and the free exchange of information
more broadly.50 Justice Fenlon’s order instead “compel[led] Google to intentionally
mislead users worldwide … about the existence of relevant and publicly accessible
websites,” impeding the “public’s right to access information.”51 The trouble with
this argument, however, was that while it was clear that providing a catalogue
is important, it was not clear how the catalogue’s links to sites that engage in
piracy constitute the provision of “relevant” information. It was unclear, that
is, how such speech served the underlying purposes that justify the freedom of
expression—truth seeking, self-fulfillment, and political engagement.52
A third line of attack concerned equitable remedy law. Google argued that the
order exceeded the scope of the relief contemplated in the case law on injunctions
on which the Respondent had relied.53 Cartier, a case on which the Court of Appeal
50. Google Factum, supra note 45 at para 42.
51. Ibid at para 41.
52. Irwin Toy Ltd v Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 927 at 976 [Irwin Toy], citing
Ford v Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] 2 SCR 712 at 765-67 [Ford]. In the former, Chief
Justice Dickson summarizes the discussion in the latter, writing that the objectives of the
right to free speech are: “(1) seeking and attaining the truth is an inherently good activity; (2)
participation in social and political decision-making is to be fostered and encouraged; and
(3) the diversity in forms of individual self-fulfillment and human flourishing ought to be
cultivated in an essentially tolerant, indeed welcoming, environment.”
53. Google Factum, supra note 45 at para 69-88, citing Mareva, supra note 21; Norwich
Pharmacal Co v Comrs of Customs and Excise, 1974 AC 133 [Norwich]; Cartier
International AG et al v British Sky Broadcasting Ltd et al, 2014 EWHC 3354 [Cartier HC];
RJR-MacDonald, supra note 42. Google argued that the injunction in RJR-MacDonald was
ordered against a party to the litigation to preserve a potential remedy against them, whereas
Google in this case is not a party. Additionally, Google argued that the Norwich orders
compel third parties to provide information to assist a wronged party, and not to “deputize
innocent third parties in an effort to assist frustrated plaintiffs dealing with defendants
who are in contempt.” Google Factum, supra note 45 at para 70. Further, Google argued
that Cartier involved an injunction against an internet service provider in a copyright
infringement case to block access to an infringing site, but the order was limited to two years
and limited geographically ... and furthermore Mareva injunctions pertain to “commercial
entities such as banks, brokerage houses and the like,” which hold the defendant’s property
and not merely one means of access to it, as in this case. Google Factum, supra note
45 at para 85.
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had placed much emphasis, involved an order against a group of internet service
providers (ISP) to block users from accessing websites of a trademark infringer.54
However, as Google noted, the court in Cartier did not rely on Norwich or other
common law authority, but on a European Enforcement Directive55 allowing for
injunctive relief in intellectual property cases where it was fair, equitable, and
proportionate.56 Justice Arnold, for the High Court for England and Wales in
Cartier, held that among the factors for assessing proportionality was the efficacy
of the measures at issue and their impact on the “fundamental rights” of other net
stakeholders, including “ISP’s freedom to conduct business” and the “freedom of
information of internet users.”57 He also explicitly considered imposing a removal
order against search engines as an alternative to an order against the ISPs in this
case, but declined to do so. He observed that while it might be possible to issue
such an order in a privacy-related case, “it is not at all clear at present that any EU
court would have power to order de-indexing on the basis of intellectual property
infringement.”58
Finally, Google argued that the lower courts were wrong in their assessment
of the comity issue. The order was at least “legally impermissible” and “contrary
to public policy” in the United States.59 Section 230 of the CDA60 provides search
engines and other online intermediaries with broad immunity for liability from
injunctive or monetary relief for acting as publishers.61 Appellate courts have
taken a broad view of the scope of this protection.62 The order here did not
entail a finding of liability but it was premised on treating Google as a publisher

54. Cartier HC, supra note 53.
55. EC, Directive 2004/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on
the enforcement of intellectual property rights [2004] OJ, L 195/16, art 11 [EC Directive], cited
in Cartier HC, supra note 53 at para 83.
56. Google Factum, supra note 45 at para 77.
57. Cartier HC, supra note 53 at paras 183, 188.
58. Google Factum, supra note 45 at para 79, citing Cartier HC, supra note 53 at para 212.
59. Ibid at para 91.
60. CDA, supra note 29.
61. Ibid.
62. Zeran v America Online Inc, 129 F (3d) 327 (4th Cir 1997); Blumenthal v Drudge, 992 F
Supp 44 (DDC 1998); Kathleen R v City of Livermore, 87 Cal (4th) 684 (App Ct 2001);
Doe v MySpace Inc, 528 F (3d) 413 (5th Cir 2008). See also Jeff Kosseff, “Twenty Years
of Intermediary Immunity: The US Experience” (2017) 14 Scripted 5 at 9. An important
recent limit to section 230 is US, Bill HR 1865, Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex
Trafficking Act of 2017, 115th Cong (recently passed in both the House and Senate). Section
4 of the Act amends section 230 of the CDA, supra note 29 by adding a provision allowing
for intermediary liability for promotion or facilitation of prostitution.
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(“inadvertently facilitating,” in Justice Fenlon’s words) contrary to section 230.63
This was a compelling argument—one that a majority of the Supreme Court in
Equustek expressed doubt upon but did not reject entirely, and one that a US court
(reviewing the order in this case) has now accepted.64 An important exception to
intermediary immunity in section 230 is immunity from intellectual property
claims.65 Soon after passing the CDA, Congress passed the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA)66 to provide a notice and takedown scheme that shields an
online provider from liability if they act in a timely fashion and remove infringing
material. But the DMCA appears to contemplate situations in which the online
provider hosts or publishes content, not where they merely link to it. Thus, the

63. Google Factum, supra note 45 at paras 98-100.
64. Following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in this case, Google sought an injunction
in California on the basis that the order cannot be enforced in the United States as contrary
to the First Amendment and section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA). See
CDA, supra note 29. In November of 2017, a US District Court in San Jose granted a
preliminary injunction on the basis that Google had demonstrated a likelihood of success
on the merits of its claim with regard to the CDA (but declined to consider the First
Amendment). Equustek did not appear. The court found the Canadian order to be contrary
to section 230 of the CDA on the basis that Google met the three-part test for immunity
under the provision: Google provides an “interactive computer service”; the information
at issue was “provided by another information content provider”; and the Canadian order
“would hold it liable as the ‘publisher or speaker’ of that information.” See Google LLC v
Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 US Dist Lexis 206818 at 2 (ND Cal 2017). However, the
6-page decision contains no discussion of the limits of section 230, and in particular its
explicit exclusion for immunity of intellectual property claims (230(c)(1)). The Court has
since issued a permanent injunction in a default judgment in Equustek’s favour. Google
LLC v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 US Dist Lexis 182194 (ND Cal 2017). For a critical
response to the preliminary injunction, see Barry Sookman, “US Court Thumbs Its Nose
at Supreme Court of Canada: Google v Equustek” (19 November 2017), online (blog):
Copyright, Intellectual Property, Computer, Internet, e-Commerce Law <www.barrysookman.
com/2018/02/18/us-court-thumbs-its-nose-at-supreme-court-of-canada-google-v-equustek>
[perma.cc/R26J-CAAH]. Sookman argues that the court here mistakenly construed the scope
of immunity under section 230, citing case law to the effect that “treating as a publisher”
means seeking to hold liable in tort. See also Michael Geist “U.S. Judge Rules Canadian
Court Order ‘Threatens Free Speech on the Global Internet’” (3 November 2017), online
(blog): Michael Geist <www.michaelgeist.ca/2017/11/googleequustekinjunction> [perma.cc/
LJA4-FH4F]. Geist sees the injunction as confirmation of the short-sightedness of Fenlon
J’s decision to impose the order in failing to foresee the inevitability of protracted litigation
abroad, leading to conflicting decisions.
65. See CDA, supra note 29. S 230(e)(2) states: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to
limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”
66. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub L No 105-304, § 512, 112 Stat 2860 (1998) (codified
as amended at 17 USC (2000)) [DMCA].
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question of whether the immunity in section 230 of the CDA protects a search
engine from merely linking to an infringing site is unclear.67
Google also pointed to the First Amendment as a basis on which the order
might violate comity. It cited case law recognizing search engine listings as
constitutionally protected speech,68 and cases on First Amendment protection
for the mere provision of information.69 However, Google did not cite a case
in which the First Amendment was held to protect a search engine or online
intermediary’s right to point to a property-infringing site.70
One further concern in relation to comity worth noting was the possible
effect of the order as a precedent. Google noted that Justice Fenlon’s order was
not premised on a finding that any of the plaintiff’s property rights outside of
Canada had been violated. It may have been based on the notion that an order
ultimately intended to prevent piracy would not be morally objectionable to any

67. Google Factum, supra note 45 at para 98. Google asserted that “American courts have
repeatedly applied [section 230 of the CDA] to bar claims for monetary or injunctive relief
against Internet search engines (including Google) for merely providing links to third-party
websites that contain objectionable or unlawful information.” It also cited two cases for this
proposition: Parker v Google and Murawski v Pataki. Neither case deals with a mere link.
Parker v Google concerns whether Google’s caching of copyrighted material constituted
infringement. 422 F Supp (2d) 492 (ED Penn 2006). In Murawski v Pataki, the plaintiff had
taken issue with the association of his name in Ask.com’s search results with the Communist
Party. 514 F Supp (2d) 577 (SDNY 2007).
68. Google Factum, supra note 45 at para 96, citing Jian Zhang et al v Baidu.com Inc, 10 F Supp
(3d) 433 (SDNY 2014); Yahoo Inc v La Ligue Contre le Recisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F
Supp (2d) 1181 (ND Cal 2001), rev’d on other grounds 145 F Supp (2d) 1168 (ND Cal
2001). On this point, see also Eric Goldman, “Of Course the First Amendment Protects
Google and Facebook (and It’s Not a Close Question)” (2018) 9 Santa Clara L Rev 1 at 2-3.
69. Google Factum, supra note 45 at para 96, citing Sorrell et al v IMS Health et al, 131 S Ct
2653 at 2667 (US Sup Ct 2011) [Sorrell]. Sorrell involved a challenge to a statue prohibiting
the publication of the prescription practices of doctors in Vermont. Justice Kennedy for
the majority, held at 2667, that “the creation and dissemination of information are speech
within the meaning of the First Amendment. Facts, after all, are the beginning point for
much of the speech that is most essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct
human affairs.”
70. See Hermès, supra note 7; Chanel, supra note 7; Richemont, supra note 7; ABS-CBN, supra
note 7; American Chemical, supra note 7. It is suggested that US courts, in cases where global
orders against search engines were imposed, have not assumed that a takedown order against
a search engine is precluded by the First Amendment. In each of these cases, however, the
orders extended to search engines incidentally (in each case, search engines are effectively
mentioned in passing); no engine was a party to any of the proceedings.

Diab, Search Engines and Global Takedown Orders 247

reasonable court. However, this would likely invite other courts to issue similar
orders based on differing views of what is reasonable.71
A host of intervenors supported Google’s position.72 Much of the argument
focused on the need to accord free expression a greater role in the test for granting
a takedown order. A number of the intervenors argued that it was inappropriate
to apply the balance of convenience test in RJR-McDonald without modification,
suggesting additional requirements such as necessity, proportionality, and
minimal impairment.73 All of them shared a concern that the order would serve
as an invitation to courts in illiberal regimes to impose global orders based on
different values.
One thread worth highlighting among these submissions was the attempt to
address the core issue in the case: Why should links pointing to a site that engages
in piracy be considered valuable speech? The Canadian Civil Liberties Association
drew a distinction between the value of the particular communication here (a
link to an infringing site) and the nature of search engine speech as a form of
commercial expression.74 The Court of Appeal had assessed the order without
according due weight to expression involving commercial speech, which the
Supreme Court has recognized in the past.75 A group of news entities calling itself
the “Media Coalition” argued that the Court of Appeal had taken too narrow a
view of the expression interests by asking only whether an order to block links
to the defendant’s site in this case would offend the values of any nation.76 This
overlooked the free expression rights of the public and the press, who use search
links for “newsgathering and accurate reporting purposes.”77 The order in this
case impeded one possible innocent use of the links: The media reporting on
71. See Google Factum, supra note 45 at para 107. Google asked:
Should Turkey grant orders prohibiting Canadians from finding and reading political
commentary written about its former Prime Minister Ataturk? Should Russia grant orders
prohibiting Canadians from finding and reading websites that contain anti-Kremlin content?
Should Thailand grant orders prohibiting Canadians from finding and watching videos critical
of the King of Thailand? Failure to limit the scope of a remedial interlocutory injunction to
Canada’s territorial boundaries puts Canadian citizens at risk of overbroad orders made in
other countries that do not share our commitment to freedom of speech.

72. See e.g. Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 34 (Factum of the Reporters
Committee for Freedom) [Reporters Factum].
73. See e.g. Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 34 (Factum of the Electronic Frontier
Foundation at para 28); Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 34 (Factum of the
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association at para 4).
74. Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 32 (Factum of the Intervener Canadian Civil
Liberties Association at para 23).
75. Ibid at para 24.
76. Reporters Factum, supra note 72 at para 26.
77. Ibid at para 28.
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Equustek or Datalink. Without search engine links, journalists would “not be
able to find the Defendants’ websites unless [they] happened to know the exact
website addresses.”78 Search links to potential sources of piracy or other kinds of
harm thus bear at least some value that should be weighed in the balance.
In its response, Equustek contested Google’s claim that the order amounted
to a form of censorship. “Google’s censorship thesis,” it argued, “was not anchored
in any legal framework”79 and Google had notably not made a Charter claim in
this case. On the contrary, Google had asked Equustek to obtain the order and
was simply taking issue with its extra-territorial scope. Justice Fenlon had rejected
the censorship argument precisely on the basis that Google had recognized the
need for takedowns in many cases and had a large staff and processes in place to
address this.80 Equustek also contended that none of the recognized purposes of
free expression in Irwin Toy81 or Ford82—self-fulfillment, truth seeking, or the
exchange of ideas for political discourse—were advanced by a link that pointed
to an IP-infringing site.83 Nor was it appropriate to apply the tests set out in cases
dealing with journalists’ sources or publication bans, given the focus in those
cases on the personal liability of journalists and the open court principle.84
Equustek’s framing of the issues was in large part an exercise in rhetorical
finesse that kept the focus of attention on the links at issue and on the notion of
Google as a facilitator. Lost or elided here was the larger significance of forcing
a neutral third-party such as Google from removing any kind of content that
merely points, regardless of what it happens to point to. Also lost here were
important distinctions between the nature of and reasons for the takedowns that
Google voluntarily conducts, or the court orders it invited Equustek to seek.
Some removals are in response to corporate policies against hate speech or child
pornography, but many others are in response to requests under legislation, such
as the DMCA, that call for removal in intellectual property cases where Google
hosts or serves the content at issue, rather than merely linking to it. And the order
Google invited the plaintiff to seek here was for a removal intended to be regional
in scope. The global order in this case did not simply mandate what Google
already does voluntarily.
78. Ibid.
79. Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 32 (Factum of the Respondent at para 84)
[Equustek Factum].
80. Ibid.
81. Irwin Toy, supra note 52.
82. Ford, supra note 52.
83. Equustek Factum, supra note 79 at para 88.
84. Ibid at paras 93-94.
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Intervenors representing music, film, and publishing industry groups offered
further support for Equustek’s position.85 They argued that a reluctance on the
part of courts to impose orders against search engines and other intermediaries
where they facilitate or are otherwise “sufficiently ‘mixed up’ in illegal activities”
would significantly hinder the “effectiveness of law online,” making it vastly more
difficult to curb hacking, privacy breaches, defamation, terrorism, and intellectual
property theft, among other acts.86 An order against a search engine is often more
practical and effective than forcing the affected party to bring proceedings in
every place the engine operates or the wrong occurs.87 Content takedown orders
have begun to be used with some frequency in Europe and the United States and
are consistent with principles underlying orders against non-parties.88 Canadian
courts have ordered Google to de-list in the past,89 and in the United States—
contrary to Google’s argument that such orders are precluded under US law—a
number of courts have issued global de-listing orders in IP-infringement cases.90
Concerns on the part of Google and free speech groups were overstated here since
“no legitimate expressive values were engaged” by Google’s links.91
B. SUPREME COURT DECISION

In a 7 to 2 decision, the majority of the Supreme Court dismissed Google’s
appeal, favouring the way Equustek and its sympathetic intervenors had framed
the issues, along with the lower courts.92 Writing on behalf of the majority, Justice
Abella dismissed Google’s argument that the order entailed an improper extension
of injunction law, affirming much of Justice Groberman’s analysis, including his
85. Google Inc v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 34 (Factum of the Interveners International
Federation of the Phonographic Industry et al) [Phonographic Industry Factum]; Google Inc
v Equustek Solutions Inc, 2017 SCC 34 (Factum of the Intervenors International Federation
of Film Producers Associations et al) [Film Producers Factum].
86. Phonographic Industry Factum, supra note 85 at paras 9-10.
87. Ibid at para 10; Film Producers factum, supra note 85 at paras 24-25.
88. Phonographic Industry Factum, supra note 85 at para 11. See e.g. APC v Orange, supra note
6; APC v Auchan Telecom SAS, Paris Reg Ct case no 11/60013 (November 28, 2013); PJS v
News Group Newspapers [2016] UKSC 26.
89. Phonographic Industry Factum, supra note 85 at para 11. See e.g. Nazerali v Mitchell, 2011
BCSC 1581; Langlois v Google Canada, 2014 QCCS 6507.
90. Phonographic Industry Factum, supra note 85 at para 11. See e.g. Hermès, supra note 7;
Chanel, supra note 7; ABS-CBN, supra note 7; American Chemical, supra note 7.
91. Phonographic Industry Factum, supra note 85 at para 21. See also Film Producers Factum,
supra note 85 at para 37. It states, “[w]here political speech is at issue, freedom of expression
values are likely to weigh against granting such an order. This case, however, falls on the
opposite side of the spectrum; the Order concerns purely commercial speech promoting
unlawful products, contrary to court orders and infringing others’ legal rights.”
92. Equustek, supra note 1.
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reliance on Cartier for the application of an injunction to an online intermediary
in a property infringement case.93 As the Court of Appeal had done, the majority
here failed to distinguish that the order in Cartier was issued not on the basis of the
common law on injunctions but under a European Enforcement Directive94—
and that the court in Cartier had considered imposing an order against search
engines but expressly declined to do so as excessive.95 Assuming that Norwich and
other common law authority properly extended to search engines in a case of this
nature, Justice Abella held that the balance of convenience in RJR-MacDonald
favoured a global injunction on the basis of both effectiveness and principle.96 Key
for Justice Abella was Justice Fenlon’s finding that in the “absence of de-indexing
… Google was facilitating Datalink’s breach” of court orders.97 The majority also
agreed with Justice Fenlon’s finding (and Google’s concession) that Datalink
could not “carry on business in a commercially viable way unless its websites
were in Google’s search results”98 and that “to be effective, even within Canada,
Google must block search results on all of its websites.”99 Characterizing the issue
in broader terms, Justice Abella wrote: “The problem in this case is occurring
online and globally. The Internet has no borders—its natural habitat is global.
The only way to ensure that the interlocutory injunction attained its objective
was to have it apply where Google operates—globally.”100 Justice Fenlon had also
found that “the majority of Datalink’s sales take place outside Canada” and thus,
Google’s suggestion that the order be limited to Canada would fail to prevent
much of the harm at issue.101 Justice Abella concluded that “Google would still be
facilitating Datalink’s breach of the court’s order” if it continued to index sites on
its non-Canadian portals; there was thus “no equity in ordering an interlocutory
injunction which has no realistic prospect of preventing irreparable harm.”102
The majority’s response to the comity and free-speech issues was brief. Justice
Abella characterized Google’s assertion that the global order might require it to
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Ibid at para 32.
EC Directive, supra note 55, arts 1, 2.
Equustek, supra note 1 at paras 31-33; Cartier HC, supra note 53 at paras 211-12.
Equustek, supra note 1 at paras 25-35, citing RJR-MacDonald, supra note 42.
Ibid at paras 34-35. The Court states:
Much like a Norwich order, or a Mareva injunction against a non-party, the interlocutory
injunction in this case flows from the necessity of Google’s assistance in order to prevent the
facilitation of Datalink’s ability to defy court orders and do irreparable harm to Equustek.
Without the injunctive relief, it was clear that Google would continue to facilitate
that ongoing harm.

Ibid at para 34.
Ibid at para 40.
Ibid at para 41.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 41.
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violate the law of a foreign jurisdiction as “theoretical.”103 Moreover, the order
would not likely give rise to a conflict of law, since it was based on the illegality
of piracy and “most countries” would “view the selling of pirated products as a
legal wrong.”104 There was no attempt here to parse the distinct roles of Datalink
and Google or differences in the value of their speech. Both Datalink’s sites and
Google’s mere indication of their whereabouts were forms of piracy on this view.
This is not to say that the traffic Google generates in pointing to Datalink is not
important to assessing the degree to which Google’s speech should be protected.
However, Justice Abella’s analysis glossed over these issues.
Justice Abella also noted that Google had not adduced evidence before Justice
Fenlon on the conflict of law issue. Without this, it “hardly seem[ed] equitable to
… put the onus on [Equustek] to demonstrate, country by country, where such
an order is legally permissible.”105 Justice Abella conceded that Google’s index is a
form of speech, but links that facilitate piracy do not warrant protection:
This is not an order to remove speech that, on its face, engages freedom of expression
values, it is an order to de-index websites that are in violation of several court orders.
We have not, to date, accepted that freedom of expression requires the facilitation of
the unlawful sale of goods.106

The majority had thus asserted that the links here possessed no value as
speech and warranted no protection whatsoever. If any balancing of interests
was to be undertaken in assessing the order, it was not between Google’s speech
and the harm to the plaintiff. It was between the inconvenience to Google in
removing the links and the inconvenience to the plaintiff in attempting to
shut down Datalink’s business in other ways. The balancing engaged here not
only failed to consider Google’s speech rights, but it also ignored the right of a
wider public to access information. Put differently, by asserting that a link that
merely points to harmful content forfeits any protection as a form of speech, the
majority was not simply affirming an order in relation to the single link in this
case—it was sanctioning a broader practice in which courts in one jurisdiction
could decide what a global public can or cannot access. There may indeed be
good reason for doing so—e.g., removing links to a video of an attack posted by a
terrorist him-or herself. Nevertheless, the point is that where this occurs, speech
interests are clearly engaged.
Justice Abella’s reasoning in relation to the nature of Google’s links here
mirrored the pattern of both courts below. Pointing to a site alleged to be the
103.
104.
105.
106.

Ibid at para 44.
Ibid. See also Equustek Solutions Inc, supra note 14 at para 144.
Ibid at para 47.
Ibid at para 48.
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source of piracy sufficed to make one’s links a form of facilitation, where the
pointing generates a large amount of traffic. The link, therefore, has little if any
value as speech and does not amount to censorship.107 The majority opinion
makes no reference to Crookes. It contains no discussion of how its approach to
hyperlinks contrasts with the Court’s earlier view—or attempts to offer any further
justification aside from implying that by generating a critical mass of visitors,
search links are qualitatively different from those contemplated in Crookes.
Justice Abella also justified the order in light of the fact that it does not
compel Google to do something it does not already do: “[A]lter search results”
by removing links to child pornography, hate speech, or requests in compliance
with the DMCA.108 Justice Abella did not refer to the CDA and did not offer any
response to Google’s contention that Section 230 of that Act precluded the kind
of order at issue here. By invoking the DMCA without reference to the CDA,
Justice Abella was suggesting that the order in this case was a parallel form of relief
to that available under the DMCA and not an infringement of the CDA. But as
noted above, the DMCA pertains to copyright infringements that occur where
intermediaries host the content at issue and not where they merely point to it.
However, Justice Abella seemed tentative in her assessment of the comity
issue, at least in relation to the US, and concluded this part of the discussion by
noting that the order allowed Google to return to court if a conflict did arise with
foreign law, “including interfering with freedom of expression.”109 The majority’s
opinion contains no further discussion or acknowledgement that speech online
might be affected by the order and no attempt was made to weigh the importance
of Google’s, or other internet users’, interests against those of the plaintiff in
issuing the order.
Writing in dissent, Justices Côté and Rowe held that Justice Fenlon’s order
was not lawfully issued and should be overturned. In their view, the injunction
was effectively permanent in this case on the basis that by removing Datalink
sites from all of Google indexes, Datalink would be put out of business. Yet
the plaintiff would not have met the test for a permanent injunction.110 This
would require “a more extensive review of the merits of the case” (an assessment

107. Ibid at para 49. Abella J states: “I have trouble seeing how this interferes with what Google
refers to as its content neutral character” since the order did not require Google to “monitor
content” or hold it liable for “facilitating access to the impugned website.”
108. Ibid at para 50.
109. Ibid at para 46.
110. Ibid at para 56.
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of whether the alleged piracy had taken place), a matter not fully settled by the
statements of defence that had been struck.111
More crucial for the present purposes was the dissent’s view of the necessity
and effect of the order. It was imposed not primarily to protect Equustek, but
to address Datalink’s failure to abide by earlier orders that it abstain from doing
business online. The harm at issue was thus not the improper use of Equustek’s
intellectual property, but the harm to the court in Datalink’s thumbing its
nose at the court by posting new sites in breach of its orders. As Justices Côté
and Rowe asserted:
Google did not aid or abet the doing of the prohibited act. … the December 2012
Order was to cease carrying on business through any website. That Order was
breached as soon as Datalink established a website to conduct its business, regardless
of how visible that website might be through Google searches [emphasis added].112

If Justice Fenlon’s order had a lawful basis, then, it was to enjoin Google as a
facilitator of Datalink’s effort to conduct business. Yet this was clearly excessive:
If Equustek’s argument were accepted, the scope of “aids and abets” would, in
our view, become overbroad. It might include the companies supplying Datalink
with the material to produce the derivative products, the companies delivering the
products, or as Google argued in its factum, it might also include the local power
company that delivers power to Datalink’s physical address.113

Taking this view of the order, Justices Côté and Rowe had no cause to engage
in a larger theory of links as a form of speech or to consider the broader impact
of the order in terms of free expression. Google, and the traffic it happens to
generate, was simply not the appropriate subject of the court’s concern.
Turning to the issue of Google’s relationship to Equustek, Justices Côté and
Rowe asserted: “The most that can be said is that the Google Order might reduce
the harm to Equustek which Justice Fenlon found ‘Google is inadvertently
facilitating’.”114 Yet, “it has not been shown that the Google Order is effective
in doing so.”115 Datalink could still be found through other engines and could
111. Ibid at para 56, citing RJR-MacDonald, supra note 42 at 338-39. The case proposes that
an injunction is effectively permanent “when the result of the application will impose such
hardship on one party as to remove any potential benefit from proceeding to trial,” in
which case “a more extensive review of the merits of the case must be undertaken.”). The
appropriate test for granting a permanent injunction is found later in the dissent. See also
Equustek, supra note 1 at para 66.
112. Ibid at para 71.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid at para 79. See also Equustek Solutions Inc, supra note 14 at para 152.
115. Ibid.
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continue to operate, suggesting that the lower court should have proceeded with
greater caution. There were also other remedies available here. The Court of
Appeal had suggested the plaintiff seek a remedy against the defendants in French
courts, on the understanding that the defendants may have assets in France.116
Equustek might also have sought an order against the ISP hosting Datalink’s
sites, as was done in Cartier.117
The two opinions in Equustek were thus premised on differing views about
the nature of the order and Google’s role in relation to it. For the majority, the
order was primarily meant to spare the plaintiff from further harm and grounded
in the court’s authority to issue injunctions to protect its own process. However,
the majority’s view of Google’s links, as a form of facilitation based on the traffic
they generate, led it to minimize the speech interests at issue. The dissent avoided
this problem by framing the order in terms of a different harm (Datalink’s
business) and casting Google’s role in it as peripheral. Lost in the Court’s debate
over the legitimacy of the order was the core substantive question in the case—are
Google’s links to a source of piracy a form of valuable speech? Following the
lower courts, the majority took the view that they are not, but Justice Abella
made no attempt to defend this view. It was a question not far from the central
issue in the Court’s earlier decision in Crookes.
C. CRITICAL RECEPTION

Before turning to Crookes, critical responses to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Equustek are worth canvasing briefly, for two reasons. They shed further light
on why global takedown orders may in some cases be necessary and why they
give rise to broader concerns in relation to freedom of expression and the rule of
law. A better sense of these concerns is relevant to crafting a more nuanced and
equitable test for takedown orders (see Part II below). Responses to Equustek also
help shed light on a certain impasse in the larger debate about content takedown
orders. Critics hold contrary assumptions about whether links to harmful content
bear value, but they tend not to articulate and defend those assumptions. This
too is important context for the discussion in Part II. I seek to make the point
here that the debate about Equustek, and takedown orders generally, has tended
to be polarized precisely because it does not rest on a clear sense of how or why
links to harmful content may or may not be valuable.

116. Ibid at para 81, citing Equustek Solutions v Jack, 2016 BCCA 190 at para 24
[Equustek v Jack].
117. Ibid 1 at para 81.
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Copyright and intellectual property advocates lauded Equustek for
recognizing the need for more effective recourse against intermediaries that assist
in property infringement. Counsel for one of the intervenors in the case, Barry
Sookman, affirmed the decision as a lesser of two evils.118 Content takedown
orders may intrude on search engine speech, but neither voluntary gestures on
the part of search portals, nor individual demands under legislation such as the
DMCA,119 offer the same practical benefits. They often result in de-listings of only
some of the impugned content and only on national portals. Nor is litigation in
all the jurisdictions in which intermediaries operate a viable solution.120 Equustek
is part of a larger trend in which courts are beginning to acknowledge that the
web’s global nature requires, in some cases, nothing short of a global order.121
Sookman’s argument is persuasive, and to their credit (and the credit of other
pro-property advocates), the intervener concedes that takedown orders engage
search engine speech interests along with those of other intermediaries. But in
lauding the Court’s holding in Equustek, Sookman and other pro-property groups
support a test for takedown orders that accords no value to the speech at issue.
The primary consideration on this view of the problem is not whether takedown
118. Barry Sookman, “Google v Equustek: Worldwide De-Indexing Order Against Google
Upheld by Supreme Court” (28 June 2017), online (blog): Copyright, Intellectual
Property, Computer, Internet, e-Commerce Law <www.barrysookman.com/2017/06/28/
worldwide-de-indexing-order-against-google-upheld-by-supreme-court-of-canada> [perma.
cc/GYA7-MWMV]. See also Neil Turkewitz, “The Internet as a Less Lawless Place: The
Rejection of Form Over Substance” (8 March 2018), online (blog): Medium <medium.
com/@nturkewitz_56674/the-internet-as-a-less-lawless-place-the-rejection-of-form-oversubstance-33cf5291ec26> [perma.cc/8HA3-UNFB].
119. DMCA, supra note 66.
120. Cf Ankita Gupta, “Google v Equustek: An Attempt to Domestically Govern a
Global Resource” (16 October 2017), online (blog): TheCourt.ca <www.thecourt.ca/
google-v-equustek-an-attempt-to-domestically-govern-a-global-resource> [perma.
cc/2V6G-E7RA]. Gupta argues that the alternative chosen in Equustek of placing the burden
on third parties such as Google to prove the contrary—that the order would be unlawful
in one or more foreign jurisdiction—will ultimately “stifle innovation and discourage
economic competition.”
121. Sookman, supra note 118. Cf Ariel Katz, “Google v Equustek: Unnecessarily Hard Cases
Make Unnecessarily Bad Law” (30 June 2017), online (blog): University of Toronto Faculty of
Law <www.law.utoronto.ca/blog/faculty?focus_area=All&research=All&uid=akatz> [perma.
cc/QHA8-MLRJ]. Katz suggests that the real issue in this case was not whether a global
order was necessary, but whether the underlying property claim had been established:
One of the remarkable things about this case is how little we know about the underlying IP
claims. Nowhere in the decision does the Court mention any Canadian IP statute, any specific
provision of any such statute, or, in the case of common law claims, refer to the relevant
doctrines using their standard legal terminology. The majority opinion says almost nothing.
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orders run a risk of censoring legitimate speech or triggering a chill, but whether
they unduly inconvenience the subject of the orders.
On the opposing side, critics of the decision were mainly concerned with
what happens when global takedown orders become pervasive. The Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) might be accused of overstatement in asserting that
Equustek is a “dangerous precedent” that will “expand the power of any court in
the world to edit the entire Internet, whether or not the targeted material or site is
lawful in another country.”122 But many observers agreed.123 For this group, Justice
Fenlon’s assertion that “most countries will likely recognize intellectual property
rights and view the selling of pirated products as a legal wrong” was beside the
point.124 The issue is not whether a court or government in one country has the
authority to make orders over cyberspace on the basis of a universal moral truth.
It is who decides what constitutes such a truth. The precedent that Equustek sets
is that a court or government can now censor any online speech it believes to be
contrary to a truth it deems universal.
The majority in Equustek declined to engage with this prospect or with
the possibility that the order at issue in the case would contribute to a chill of
online speech. Yet, as Daphne Keller has argued, a takedown order on speech
can readily give rise to chilling effects of a broad potential scope that are subtle,
but significant:
A critic of, say, the Vietnamese government may be safely ensconced in the US or
Germany, far from the reach of Vietnamese state power. But her online speech is
not. It depends on the support of global intermediaries like Google if it is to easily
122. Aaron Mackey, Corynne McSherry, & Vera Ranieri, “Top Canadian Court Permits
Worldwide Internet Censorship” (28 June 2017), online (blog): Electronic Frontier
Foundation <www.eff.org/deeplinks/2017/06/top-canadian-court-permits-worldwideinternet-censorship> [perma.cc/7SJ6-9UEP].
123. See e.g. Michael Geist, “Global Internet Takedown Orders Come to Canada: Supreme
Court Upholds International Removal of Google Search Results” (28 June 2017), online
(blog): Michael Geist, <www.michaelgeist.ca/2017/06/global-internet-takedown-orderscome-canada-supreme-court-upholds-international-removal-google-search-results> [perma.
cc/96QU-MKLB]; Daphne Keller, “Ominous: Canadian Court Orders Google to Remove
Search Results Globally” (28 June 2017), online (blog): The Center for Internet and Society
at Stanford Law School <cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2017/06/ominous-canadian-courtorders-google-remove-search-results-globally> [perma.cc/UC6P-YMZZ]; Mike Masnick,
“Canadian Supreme Court Says It’s Fine To Censor The Global Internet; Authoritarians
& Hollywood Cheer...” (28 June 2017), online (blog): techdirt <www.techdirt.com/
articles/20170628/11273937689/canadian-supreme-court-says-fine-to-censor-globalinternet-authoritarians-hollywood-cheer.shtml> [perma.cc/LBU8-FND3]; Gupta,
supra note 120.
124. Equustek, supra note 1 at para 44.
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be found. In practice it often depends on the support of web hosts like Amazon
Web Services, as well. A country with no jurisdictional hooks to the speaker may
very well have legal and practical power over these intermediaries. The Canadian
decision increases the odds that this power will be exercised on a global rather than
national basis–effectively reaching out and silencing speakers on the other side of
the world.125

The chilling effect that Keller outlines here points to a well-known doctrine
in Anglo-American jurisprudence on free expression grounded in the concern
that a state sanctioned limitation on speech could hinder truthful reporting or
communication by promoting self-censorship.126 The doctrine recognizes that
potentially affected actors may be less inclined to communicate freely out of a
fear of being held liable despite their innocence; reluctant to incur great expense
to defend themselves, even if they are eventually vindicated; or dissuaded to
speak due to their uncertainty as to the validity of their legal position.127 Keller’s
concerns—echoing those of Google—about the possible impact of Equustek
orders becoming a common practice are well supported by a sizable body of
scholarship on chilling effects of analogous, though more limited, powers in
domestic legislation, such as the notice and takedown regime of the DMCA.128
Some of this research supports the concern that, as with the DMCA, global

125. Keller, supra note 123.
126. See Frederick Schauer, “Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the ‘Chilling
Effect’” (1978) 58 BUL Rev 685, tracing the use of the term to Dombrowski v Pfister, 380 US
479 (1965). For an examination of the doctrine in the context of online intermediaries, see
Wendy Seltzer, “Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling Effects of the
DMCA on the First Amendment” (2010) 24 Harvard JL & Tech 171.
127. Seltzer, supra note 126 at 193, drawing on Schauer, supra note 126 at 689.
128. DMCA, supra note 66. Scholarship on chilling effects in the digital sphere, in addition to
Seltzer, ibid, includes Jennifer M Urban & Laura Quilter, “Efficient Process or ‘Chilling
Effects’? Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act”
(2005) 22 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech LJ 621; Judith Townend, “Online chilling
effects in England and Wales,” online: (2014) 3 Internet Policy Rev 1, <policyreview.info/
articles/analysis/online-chilling-effects-england-and-wales> [perma.cc/4DB4-VTD2];
Jonathon W Penney, “Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use” (2016)
31 BTLJ 117; Zoe Carpou, “Robots, Pirates, and the Rise of the Automated Takedown
Regime: Using the DMCA to Fight Piracy and Protect End-Users” (2016) 39 Colum JL &
Arts 551; Jonathon Penney, “Internet Surveillance, Regulation, and Chilling Effects Online:
A Comparative Case Study,” online: (2017) 6 Internet Policy Rev 1 <policyreview.info/
articles/analysis/internet-surveillance-regulation-and-chilling-effects-online-comparativecase> [perma.cc/2YQT-ZXB2]. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer of this paper
for pointing me to these sources.
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takedown orders could cast a chill on a wider range of speakers (such as artists,
activists, and entrepreneurs), as well as large intermediaries.129
We might soon, therefore, see a splintering of the internet into differing
regimes of access and content, depending on how or where we go online.130
We might also see an increasing “sanitization” of the internet as interventions
by countries with differing ideas of acceptability become more common.131
Katherine Maher, a director of the Wikimedia Foundation, noted that:
If any country can demand the worldwide removal of search results, vast sections
of history, science and culture could disappear from the global Internet. This could
infringe on our ability to learn about the history of Tiananmen Square, the potential
medical properties of cannabis, the discoveries of Darwin, or unsavoury allegations
against the U.S. president-elect.132

Moreover, as the EFF argues, wealth could complicate matters further “as
well-resourced individuals engage in international forum-shopping to impose the
one country’s restrictive laws regarding free expression on the rest of the world.”133
The Supreme Court in Equustek may also have overlooked the implications
of the order on the rule of law. Michael Geist noted that if Equustek-type orders
become frequent, Google, Twitter, and other intermediaries will often be placed
in a position of having to “pick and choose among orders they are willing to
follow.”134 Should they decline to follow overbroad orders from repressive regimes
(e.g., Iran and North Korea) and follow only those consistent with the First
Amendment?135 If so, on what basis? Whereas the Equustek order was imposed
to address concerns about lawlessness online, it could readily have the effect of
inviting many conflicting orders that would ultimately diminish the rule of law
129. See e.g. Seltzer, supra note 126 at 210-18; Carpou, supra note 128 at 565-67.
130. Davey Alba, “The World May Be Headed For a Fragmented ‘Splinternet’” (7 July 2017),
online (blog): WIRED <www.wired.com/story/splinternet-global-court-rulings-googlefacebook> [perma.cc/5C9C-Z734].
131. Ibid.
132. Katherine Maher, “When search engines omit results, our rights are jeopardized” The
Globe and Mail (9 December 2016) online: <www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/
when-search-engines-omit-results-our-rights-are-jeopardized/article33240768>
[perma.cc/5425-QAB4].
133. Mackey, supra note 122. Cf Paul Ohm, “We Couldn’t Kill the Internet if We Tried” (2016)
130 Harv L Rev F 79. Ohm suggests that well-founded concerns about the detrimental
impact of judicial or regulatory interventions in cyberspace have been common since the
earlier 90s, but are consistently proven overstated as the internet, and software in particular,
continues to grow and show itself to be more robust than feared.
134. Geist, supra note 123.
135. Ibid.
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online.136 National courts and governments would address rule of law concerns
more effectively by acting with greater restraint to avoid creating a mesh of
conflicting law.137
Both perspectives on Equustek raise valid concerns. But they entail a shift
of focus away from a core issue in the case: Why are search links to harmful
content a valuable form of speech that merit protection, or at least some weight
in the balancing test for granting a takedown order? Critics of Equustek were
not unanimous in the view that content takedown orders are never permissible.
Most of the debate is focused instead on the general effects of such orders and
the best forum for crafting takedown regulations. Yet, the core substantive issue
remains: What is the value of speech that may be subject to such orders? Part II
considers the Supreme Court’s earlier engagement with the nature of links as a
basis for the answer to this question, with a view to crafting a more equitable test
for takedown orders.

II. A BETTER BALANCE
A. CROOKES V NEWTON AND THE COURT’S OTHER THEORY OF LINKS

As noted earlier, neither the majority nor the dissent in Google v Equustek
explored in any depth the issue of search engine links as a form of speech or what
protection they warrant. By contrast, the Court in Crookes v Newton138 examined
hyperlinks as a form of speech in the context of defamation at some length.
Despite the fact that Justice Abella wrote the majority opinion in both cases,
the thrust of the earlier holding appears to run contrary to the gist of the later
holding. On closer inspection, as will be seen below, the cases can be reconciled
in part. But more importantly, Crookes offered a theory of links as a form of
expression that was grounded in a broader view of the internet as an information
medium.139 This part will argue that the Court ought to have applied this theory
in Equustek. It offers a basis for a more equitable test for takedown orders.

136.
137.
138.
139.

Ibid.
Ibid. See also Keller, supra note 123.
Crookes, supra note 18.
This is not to say that it entailed a more expansive concept of free speech. See e.g. Mitchell
Drucker, “Canadian v. American Defamation Law: What Can We Learn From Hyperlinks?”
(2013) 38 Can-USLJ 141. Drucker notes important differences in the Supreme Court’s
approach to links in Crookes from that of US appellate courts, applying a more expansive
concept of free speech under the First Amendment.

260

(2019) 56 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Crookes v Newton was concerned with whether links to defamatory content
constitute a form of publication (thus, in a broader sense, facilitation).140
Crookes, a member of the Green Party, had sued several parties for posting
allegedly defamatory articles about him online, as part of a “smear campaign”
against him and the party.141 Newton ran a website in British Columbia on which
he posted commentary on the topic of free speech online. One post was titled
“Free Speech in Canada,” containing two links to defamatory material about
Crookes. One link pointed to an article containing defamatory statements, the
other to a page containing further links to pages containing defamatory content.
Crookes asked Newton to remove the links, but Newton declined. Crookes did
not allege that any of the content on Newton’s site was defamatory, only that his
links constituted publication.142 Newton’s page had been “viewed” 1,788 times,
but no evidence was adduced at trial that any visitors had clicked the links.143
The trial judge declined to accept that the presence of a link on a visited
page should give rise to a presumption that the impugned content had been
accessed.144 The court held that links are analogous to footnotes because they
refer to, rather than repeat, the content at issue.145 Without repetition, there
could be no publication. And without evidence that the links had been visited,
publication had not been established. At the Court of Appeal, Justices Saunders
and Bauman agreed with the footnote analogy and held that links are not a form
publication because they do not repeat the content at issue.146 The context or
language surrounding links may constitute “encouragement or invitation,” but
this was not the case here.147 Nor could access to the linked content be inferred
from the fact of the site having been trafficked.148
Writing for a majority of the Supreme Court, Justice Abella held that “a
hyperlink, by itself, should never be seen as ‘publication’ of the content to
which it refers.”149 She drew upon earlier US and Canadian jurisprudence to

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Crookes, supra note 18 at para 3.
Ibid at paras 6-8.
Ibid at para 10.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 11, summarizing findings in Crookes v Wikimedia Foundation Inc,
2008 BCSC 1424.
Crookes, supra note 18 at para 11.
Ibid at para 12, summarizing findings in Crookes v Wikimedia Foundation
Inc, 2009 BCCA 392.
Crookes, supra note 18 at para 12.
Ibid, citing paras 89 and 92 of the decision.
Ibid at para 14.
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support a view of hyperlinks as a form of “reference” akin to a footnote150 and
the proposition that reference without repetition is not publication.151 For Justice
Abella, links are distinct from other acts that constitute publication, because
“on its own [referencing] does not involve exerting control over the content.”152
Justice Abella noted that “[c]ommunicating something is very different from
merely communicating that something exists or where it exists.”153 Control is
also crucial. A person might link to a site that changes its content without the
person being aware of it.154 On the question of whether a link facilitates access
to defamatory content, Justice Abella offered a theory clearly in tension with the
view of linking in Equustek:
Although the person selecting the content to which he or she wants to link might
facilitate the transfer of information (a traditional hallmark of publication), it is
equally clear that when a person follows a link they are leaving one source and moving
to another. In my view, then, it is the actual creator or poster of the defamatory
words in the secondary material who is publishing the libel when a person follows
a hyperlink to that content. The ease with which the referenced content can be
accessed does not change the fact that, by hyperlinking, an individual is referring
the reader to other content.155

She added that the ease with which links render content accessible “does
not change the reality that a hyperlink, by itself, is content neutral—it expresses
no opinion, nor does it have any control over, the content to which it refers.”156
A person linking is merely pointing, not repeating a defamation. Something
more is required to transform a link into publication.
Justice Abella justified this approach in light of the Court’s recent jurisprudence
on expression. The primary concern in earlier case law on defamation had been
protecting an individual’s reputation.157 But in Hill v Church of Scientology of

150. Ibid at para 30.
151. Ibid at paras 21-24, citing Klein v Biben, 296 NY 638 (NY Ct App 1946) and MacFadden v
Anthony, 117 NYS 2d 520 (Sup Ct 1952). See also Carter v British Columbia Federation of
Foster Parents Association, 2005 BCCA 398 at para 12. The court stated that: “reference to an
article containing defamatory comment without repetition of the comment itself should not
be found to be a republication of such defamatory comment.”
152. Ibid at para 26.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid at para 27.
155. Ibid at para 29, citing Dell Computer Corporation v Union des consommateurs, 2007 SCC 34
at paras 97-102.
156. Ibid at para 30.
157. Ibid at para 32.
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Toronto,158 the Court recognized that defamation also engages “the public’s
interest in protecting freedom of expression.”159 Recent cases have emphasized
“the importance of achieving a proper balance between protecting an individual’s
reputation and the foundational role of freedom of expression in the development
of democratic institutions and values.”160 The majority in Crookes extended this
logic to “the core significance of the role of hyperlinking to the Internet.”161 The
majority stated that:
Hyperlinks have long been understood to be critical to communication because
they facilitate access to information. … [I]f the Internet is an endless expanse of
information where ‘any person … can become a pamphleteer’ then ‘[h]yper-links
are the paths among websites, creating the bustling street corners for distribution
of those pamphlets and inviting passersby to engage more deeply with the issues
raised.’162

Holding that links are a form of publication would risk “seriously restricting
the flow of information and, as a result, freedom of expression. The potential
‘chill’ in how the internet functions could be devastating.”163
The majority had thus made clear that links are important to the internet’s
broader role as an information medium—but does this mean that links to
defamatory content are worth protecting? The decision offered only an indirect
response to this question when Justice Abella asserted, “I am not persuaded that
exposing mere hyperlinks to the traditional publication rule ultimately protects
reputation.”164 The Court in Grant had held that publication requires that the
defendant “conveys a defamatory meaning,” which depends in turn on whether
the words would “tend[] to lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking
members of society.”165 The context in which a link is offered might convey a
“defamatory meaning,” in which case, the link would be publication. However,

158. See ibid at para 31, summarizing Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 SCR 1130.
159. Crookes, supra note 18 at para 31. At para 32, Justice Abella traces the shift away from a focus
on protecting reputation to the development of the “honest belief ” element in fair comment,
in WIC Radio Ltd v Simpson, 2008 SCC 40 and the defence of “responsible communication
on matters of public interest” in Grant v Torstar Corp, 2009 SCC 61 [Grant].
160. Crookes, supra note 18 at para 32, citing Grant, supra note 159 at para 1 and Hill, supra note
158 at para 101.
161. Ibid at para 36.
162. Ibid at para 35, citing Anjali Dalal, “Protecting Hyperlinks and Preserving First Amendment
Values on the Internet” (2011) 13 U Pa J Const L 1017 at 1019.
163. Ibid at para 36.
164. Ibid at para 39.
165. Ibid.

Diab, Search Engines and Global Takedown Orders 263

that kind of case involves more than mere reference.166 Lacking this additional
element, Justice Abella concluded, the “most effective remedy lies with the person
who actually created and controls the content.”167 Applying this test, Newton’s
links did not constitute publication.168
The majority’s implied answer to the question of why a “mere reference”
to defamatory content in the form a link warrants protection is twofold. First, this
is because a link to defamatory content is a mere assertion of fact that something
exists: On its own, it is “content-neutral … expresses no opinion” and has no
control over the content to which it refers.169 It may have the effect of facilitating,
but it should not be considered active facilitation. Secondly, links to defamatory
content warrant protection, because links per se are vital to the function of the
net as an information medium. A link might facilitate access to harmful content,
but the harm of censoring mere links (and the potential chilling effect) would be
greater than the further harm that might be avoided to the plaintiff’s reputation
by removing the link. Where a reference does not repeat a defamation, the “most
effective” remedy lies with the source of the defamation itself.
This entire approach to links, however, rests on the assumption that individual
links to defamatory content are likely to be less harmful than the source text
of the defamation itself. This is clearly not the case where a link to the source
appears on a large portal that generates much more traffic to the source than it
might attract on its own or more than a blogger or news agency might send it.
The case of a large portal presents a conundrum not considered in Crookes—one
where the balancing may indeed favour holding the portal liable for publication,
on the basis that this would be the most effective way of preventing harm. Yet,
166. Ibid at para 40.
167. Ibid at para 41.
168. Ibid at para 44. Chief Justice McLachlin, along with Justice Fish, concurred with the
majority’s theory of hyperlinks, but differed on when a link might constitute publication.
Justice Abella asserted that a link crosses the line from reference to publications when “a
defendant uses a reference in a manner that in itself conveys defamatory meaning about the
plaintiff.” See ibid at para 40. It was also noted that this can occur where a link is situated in
a context that “conveys defamatory meaning” or where the defendant has “actually expressed
something defamatory” or where he or she “repeats the defamatory content.” Chief Justice
McLachlin and Fish J, by contrast, would find publication if the text “indicates adoption
or endorsement of the content of the hyperlinked text.” See ibid at para 48. In dissent,
Justice Deshamps rejected the notion that control over defamatory content was necessary for
publication. Justice Deschamps held that in some circumstances a link, on its own, could
constitute publication, suggesting a broader “totality of the circumstances” test. The Court
was unanimous in its holding that Newton’s links here did not constitute publication. See
ibid paras 105-110.
169. Ibid at para 30.
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holding a portal liable for publication or facilitation would be inconsistent with
the majority’s theory in Crookes that links are “content-neutral” and merely refer
to the existence and location of other content. The solution would seem to be
a test, which recognizes that a large portal like Google can inadvertently play a
significant part in facilitating harm and is therefore responsible—though not
liable—for publication.
Notably, none of the tests set out in the three opinions in Crookes considers
the amount of traffic a link generates in assessing whether it constitutes
publication. By contrast, for the majority in Equustek, the traffic that Google’s
links generate formed the primary basis of the holding that Google plays a large
role in facilitating the harm at issue; a global takedown order was the most
convenient and likely the most effective form of relief. By placing an emphasis on
traffic, however, the majority in Equustek failed to do what it did in Crookes—see
the links at issue as part of a larger practice of linking per se, a practice that
engages a larger set of values and interests.
While it is clear that a greater amount of traffic can change the equation when
assessing the role that links play in facilitating or even causing harm, much of the
analysis of the nature of links in Crookes still applies to search engines and other
intermediaries. Regardless of how much traffic Google sends to other sites, on its
own, its index is nothing more than a form of mere reference. It thus engages a
right to free expression. One important dimension of this right is the provision
of accurate information. As the press group in Equustek argued, even a search link
to a site engaging in piracy might still serve an innocent purpose (e.g., research
on Datalink).170 This does not mean that free speech should prevail absolutely
over concerns about harm that Google’s traffic might facilitate. It is simply to
suggest that expression interests ought to be given some weight when considering
whether to impose a global content takedown order. In Equustek, the majority
declined to accord them any at all.171
B. A MORE EQUITABLE TEST

At the Supreme Court, Google and its sympathetic intervenors tried unsuccessfully
to persuade the Court to adopt a test for imposing a global takedown order other
than the one set out in RJR-MacDonald—one that would accord greater weight
170. Reporters Factum, supra note 72 at para 28.
171. Equustek, supra note 1 at para 48. Justice Abella writes: “[t]his is not an order to remove
speech that, on its face, engages freedom of expression values, it is an order to de-index
websites that are in violation of several court orders. We have not, to date, accepted that
freedom of expression requires the facilitation of the unlawful sale of goods.”
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to free expression. Assuming that search links to harmful content do still merit
protection on the basis that links per se are a valuable form of speech, this part
of the commentary attempts to sketch a more equitable test that courts might
adopt for issuing injunctive extra-territorial orders to remove content in cases
where a portal facilitates by merely linking. It does so by drawing upon two
earlier models.
In 2012, Parliament amended the Copyright Act (CA)172 to include provisions
that serve an analogous role to ones found in the DMCA in the United States,173
limiting the liability of ISP and search engines for copyright infringement.174
The new section 41.27(1) of the CA, dealing with search engines in particular,
contemplates a situation in which a search engine is “found to have infringed
copyright by making a reproduction of the work or other subject matter or
by communicating that reproduction to the public by telecommunication.”175
In these cases, the provision limits the scope of relief against a search engine to
an injunction to remove the content where notice has been received and other
conditions have been met.176 It thus contemplates something like the balance
sketched above—i.e., the search engine be held responsible for “communicating”
an unlawful reproduction, but not be held liable.
Section 41.27 offers further guidance by setting out factors a court should
consider when deciding whether to grant an injunction. Section 41.27(4.1)
asks the court to weigh the “harm likely to be suffered by the copyright owner”
without the injunction against the “burden imposed” on the search engine,
172. Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42.
173. DMCA, supra note 66 at 165. I credit Google Factum, supra note 45 for suggesting the 2012
amendments to the Copyright Act as a model on which to draw here.
174. CMA, supra note 6. See also Canada, Legal and Legislative Affairs Division,
Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Legislative Summary of Bill C-11:
An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, by Dara Lithwick and Maxime-Olivier Thibodeau,
Publication No 41-1-C11-E (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 14 October 2011), online:
<web.archive.org/web/20170302115527/http://www.lop.parl.gc.ca/content/lop/
LegislativeSummaries/41/1/c11-e.pdf>.
175. The first part of this passage appears to contemplate the auto-complete or snippet-view
functions, but the second part would seem to apply more broadly to links to sources of
infringing content.
176. In the case of a search engine, the main condition is that a search engine remove
reproductions of copyrighted work that might appear on an index incidental to the operation
of the portal (caching, autocomplete, etc.) within 30 days of receiving notice. See Copyright
Act, supra note 172, ss 41.27(1)-(3). Judicial consideration of the provision is limited. See e.g.
Trader v CarGurus, 2017 ONSC 1841. The court held that CarGurus, a site which primarily
hosted car ads that duplicated thousands of pictures posted on Autotrader, is not a search
engine for the purposes of section 41.27 of the Copyright Act.
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including the “aggregate effect of the injunction”; “whether implementing the
injunction would be technically feasible and effective”; “the availability of less
burdensome and comparably effective means of preventing” the infringement;
and perhaps most significantly, “whether implementing the injunction would
interfere with the use of the informational location tool for non-infringing acts.”
Collectively, the factors to be weighed here suggest that Parliament had
recognized that search engine links engage free speech interests and that an order
against a search engine can have wider effects. The factors also imply a view close
to the one in Crookes—that links are valuable per se as core to the function of the
internet as a communication medium. More crucially, the Act compels courts to
balance the interests of a search engine against those of a copyright holder even
where the court has “found [the engine] to have infringed copyright by making a
reproduction of the work … or by communicating that reproduction.”177 In other
words, even where the court has found that a search engine does more than merely
refer by linking—where, for example, through snippet view, caching, or other
means, the engine reproduces a work—the court must still consider the impact of
an order on the engine’s speech interests. The entire test is premised on the view
that, despite such infringements, a search engine serves a larger public interest as
an information intermediary and courts should tread carefully when imposing
orders that impede this function. If Parliament embraced this reasoning in cases
where search engines are found to infringe copyright, the same reasoning should
apply more readily to cases where a portal merely refers.
A second source on which courts might draw on in crafting a more equitable
test is the Manila Principles on Intermediary Liability (Manila Principles).178 The
Manila Principles emerged from a conference in 2015 of digital rights and free
speech advocates in Manila addressing the regulation of online expression.179 The
document reflects a clear emphasis on the speech rights of intermediaries and
places a high bar for content restriction orders. But it warrants considering as an
attempt to address competing concerns of a range of stakeholders.
The Manila Principles hold that: (1) intermediaries should be shielded from
liability for third-party content; (2) removal orders should require a court order;
and (3) orders should be imposed only where necessary and proportionate.180
177. Copyright Act, supra note 172, s 41.27(1).
178. Manila Principles, supra note 19.
179. Giancarlo Frosio, “Welcome to the Manila Intermediary Liability Principles!” (27
March 2015), online (blog): The Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School
<cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2015/03/welcome-manila-intermediary-liability-principles>
[perma.cc/8NWR-3KGC].
180. Manila Principles, supra note 19, Principles 1-2, 4.
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Consistent with the holding in Crookes, the Manila Principles call for intermediary
immunity for third-party content “in circumstances where they have not been
involved in modifying that content.”181 As with the CA provisions discussed
above, the Manila Principles would preclude intermediaries from being held
liable for “hosting unlawful third-party content” or being required to “monitor
content proactively.”182 A court order imposing content restrictions should be
premised on “a determination that the content is unlawful in the jurisdiction.”183
Orders would be necessary and proportionate where they targeted the “specific
content at issue,” involved “the least restrictive technical means,” and were
limited by geographic scope where the content itself is shown to be “unlawful in
a particular geographic region.”184 The document thus reflects a view that harkens
back to Crookes—that links and another content online ought to be interfered
with cautiously and only after expression interests are clearly outweighed by
other, pressing considerations.
The Manila Principles speak of “content restriction” and “intermediary
liability,” with the latter referring to damages. The text is silent on search engine
links to questionable content but does not appear to preclude a restriction order
of this kind.185 Nor do the Manila Principles prohibit extra-territorial orders. But
the text implies that these are appropriate only where a party seeking the order
establishes the unlawful nature of the content at issue in the jurisdictions to which
the order would extend. Put differently, before a court issues an extra-territorial
order, an applicant must demonstrate entitlement based on an extra-territorial
right, rather than the court simply assuming it, as was the case in Google v
Equustek.186 Extra-territorial orders are thus understood to be the exception
rather than the rule. Viewing them as exceptional reflects an assumption that

181.
182.
183.
184.

Ibid, Principle 1(b).
Ibid, Principle 1(d).
Ibid, Principle 2(b)(1).
Ibid, Principle 4. See especially 4(d), which states: “If content is restricted because it is
unlawful in a particular geographic region, and if the intermediary offers a geographically
variegated service, then the geographical scope of the content restriction must be so limited.”
185. However, the omission might also imply that an Equustek-type order exceeds the reasonable
scope of content restriction against an intermediary.
186. Equustek, supra note 1. Justice Abella proposes that it was impractical to require to the
plaintiff to prove the order would not violate comity—would not be unlawful—in each
jurisdiction to which the order would apply. The Manila Principles contemplate something
different: a requirement to prove an entitlement to an extra-territorial order based on a right
that extends extraterritorially (e.g., a property right under international law). See Manila
Principles, supra note 19.
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orders extending to jurisdictions where the content has not been established to
be unlawful will have unduly deleterious effects on speech.
A more equitable test for content takedown orders might draw, then, on two
key features common to the two tests canvassed above: The need to establish
necessity and proportionality.187 An extra-territorial or global order to remove a
link would be necessary only if a form of direct relief against the defendant or the
source of harm at issue would not be comparably effective. The order would be
proportionate only if its scope constitutes the least intrusive means of addressing
the harm at issue in terms of the content restricted, the duration of the order, and
its geographic scope.
If this test were applied in Equustek, would a global order have been imposed?
Possibly. But Equustek would have had to establish it was necessary by showing
that it had a right extending beyond Canada to enjoin the defendant from selling
the products at issue anywhere in the world. The majority of the Supreme Court
failed to address this issue and Justices Côté and Rowe in dissent emphasized that
such a right had not been established by the litigation to that point. The plaintiff
would also have needed to demonstrate proportionality by showing that a removal
order against Google would be more effective than an order against the company
running the server (or the ISP) hosting the defendant’s websites. The courts at
all three levels in Equustek failed to give this possibility adequate consideration.
In granting the order, Justice Fenlon noted only in passing that Datalink had
become a “virtual company” conducting business through a “complex and ever
expanding network of websites,” without detailing the plaintiff’s efforts to locate
the particular servers on which the sites were hosted.188 The Court of Appeal,
which upheld Justice Fenlon’s order, was similarly vague on this point, noting
that “[a]lthough we are advised that the plaintiffs have made some efforts to
determine where the defendants manufacture and warehouse their product, and
to determine where the product is shipped from, they have not been successful.”189
The majority of the Supreme Court overlooked the issue entirely.
By contrast, the dissent highlighted the prospect of an order against the
relevant server or ISP as a viable alternative.190 This possibility had come to light
in a later decision of the Court of Appeal (relating to an order for the seizure of
assets) indicating that Datalink and associated persons had assets in France and
187. Intervenors in Equustek before the Supreme Court of Canada had also included these factors
in their proposed tests. See supra note 73.
188. Equustek Solutions Inc, supra note 14 at para 7.
189. Equustek BCCA, supra note 40 at para 18.
190. Equustek, supra note 1 at para 81.
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that French courts were receptive to an application to seize them.191 Noting this
information, Justices Côté and Rowe suggested the lower courts should have
directed Equustek to try that route first and possibly also to “pursue injunctive
relief against the ISPs” hosting Datalink’s sites.192 A further possibility was
that “Equustek could initiate contempt proceedings in France or in any other
jurisdiction with a link to the illegal websites.”193 There were at least a few options
to consider. Once again, they may have been found impractical or ineffective.
However, they ought to have been canvassed at greater length.

III. CONCLUSION
Google v Equustek is part of a broader trend among courts and lawmakers to view
online intermediaries as facilitators of harm, where they point a critical mass
of users to the sources of harmful content. The trend runs contrary to a body
of law recognizing a need to protect the freedom to link or refer to content in
light of the importance of links to the function of the internet as an information
medium. However, the critical mass theory of links as a form of inadvertent
facilitation is undeniably valid: In some cases, large portals and search engines
do significantly contribute to the harm at issue by generating most of the traffic.
In some cases, ordering a search engine or large intermediary to remove links or
to block access may indeed be a necessary and proportionate response. Yet, courts
cannot make fair assessments of necessity and proportionality here without first
recognizing that all links bear value as speech and implicate the interests of both
intermediaries and users—even those that point to harmful content.
Critics of the Equustek decision have thus far focused mainly on the potential
impact of a decision to impose a global delisting order and the fear that it will
encourage courts in illiberal countries to impose similar orders premised on
differing views of right and wrong. An equally crucial take away from the decision,
from the current wave of case law and regulation premised on the critical mass
theory of linking, is that advocates of free speech online need to be clearer about
the value of links to harmful content in particular and why they merit protection.
Equustek marked Google’s repeated failure to make a clear and persuasive case
on this point at the Supreme Court. Without explaining how or why, it merely
asserted that all of its links, including those to sources of harmful content, were
“relevant” to users and to forms of expression that warrant a measure of protection
191. Equustek v Jack, supra note 116 at para 24.
192. Ibid at para 81.
193. Ibid.
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in accordance with common law and Charter jurisprudence. The majority of the
Court responded by making a similar unsupported assertion, that a link to a
source of piracy bears little if any value as speech.
The reasoning in Crookes offers advocates of free expression a basis for a
more persuasive case. Where search engines and large portals point to harmful
content, the links may need to be removed. However, courts should be cautious
in interfering and in ordering them to do so, given that links and portals per se
play a central role in the function of the internet as a public forum. Courts should
therefore never apply a test for content removal—much less a global removal
order—premised on the view that no valid expression interests are engaged by
individual links or forms of reference. The Supreme Court’s failure to recognize
this was shortsighted and the test it crafted in Equustek should not be followed
by other courts. The concerns about its potential impact as a precedent canvassed
above are valid. A more equitable test, aiming to accord greater protection of the
speech interests of large platforms, would likely go some distance in addressing
these concerns, thus limiting the impact of takedown orders on the internet’s
function as a global public sphere.

